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Book Review 
Is There a Caring Crisis? 
The Feminine Economy and Economic Man : Reviving the Role of the 
Family in the Postindustrial Age, Shirley P. Burggraf. Reading, MA: 
Perseus Books, 1999 (2d ed.). Pp. 271. $15.00. 
AmyL. \Vaxt 
Introduction 
Economist Shirley Burggrafs book The Feminine Econorny and 
Economic Man claims that a crisis confronts Western Civilization: we are 
investing too little in the next generation. 1 A fundamental premise of 
Burggrafs analysis is that an ample supply of resources for children is 
central and indispensable to the maintenance of a good society. 2 Although 
Burggraf gives some attention to public or collective investments in 
children (most notably public education), her principal concern is the 
private resources that parents devote to their own children. She attaches 
special importance to parents' personal attention and suggests that there 
looms a shortage of the kind of direct, hands-on care that parents, and 
especially mothers, have customarily supplied within the family and 
outside the market economy.3 An undersupply of parental nurture threatens 
to undermine children's chances of growing up to become worthy and 
productive adults, with negative consequences for those children and for 
society as a whole.4 
If a shortfall in parental investment in children indeed confronts us at 
the dawn of the twenty-first century, what is the solution? Although 
Burggraf recommends a menu of measures for strengthening the family 
and improving education, she puts a great deal of faith in one item in 
particular: an intriguing but impractical proposal for reforming Social 
Security.5 She suggests that the existing program be scrapped in favor of 
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one that incorporates a "parental dividend."6 Her proposal would introduce 
three key changes in the program's structure. First, although her old-age 
pension scheme would be publicly mandated and administered, each 
person's retirement fund would be maintained separately.7 The proposal 
would thus eliminate the current elements of pooling and redistribution 
among beneficiaries at different income levels. 8 Second, the money in the 
fund used to support a beneficiary's retirement would come from a tax on 
the income of a beneficiary's own children.9 A person's entitlement to 
benefits from a private fund would therefore depend on the beneficiary 
having children of his or her own. Finally, the amount available to fund a 
person's old age would depend on how much that person's offspring paid 
into the fund. That amount would in tum depend on the children's duration 
of employment and level of earnings-that is on their success in the 
marketplace for labor. 10 
Hmv does Burggraf negotiate the distance between her theory of a 
nurture shortage and her proposal to overhaul a beloved, but beleaguered 
social program 11 along the lines of the parental dividend? Finessing this 
link requires Burggrafs book to be about much more than old-age pension 
programs and to cover a great deal more ground than the usual brief for 
Social Security reform. In 200 pages, Burggraf puts forward a host of 
propositions based on a dizzying array of assumptions about history, 
psychology, ideology, child development, the nature of the feminist 
revolution, social evolution, and people's responses to economic 
incentives. 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Burggrafs tour through these 
topics is her methodology. Burggraf is an economist. In an attempt to 
construct a reasonably rigorous framework within which to preach to the 
unconverted, Burggraf employs the basic tools of economic analysis with 
mixed success. She assumes, controversially, that private and emotional1y 
6 See irl. at 69-81. As currently structured, Social Security is funded through taxes on 
wages and maintains no pretense of actuarial soundness. It is a pay-as-you-go scheme that depends on 
taxes levied on the working population to fund outlays to retirees. A continuous supply of taxpaying 
productive workers is essential to keep the system afloat. For a description of the nuts and bolts of 
Social Security, see SARA. LEVITAN ET AL., PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR (7th ed. I998). 
7 See BURGGRAF, supra note I, at 69. 
8 On the redistributive element in Social Security, see MI1v1f ABRAMOWITZ, REGULATING 
THE LIVES OF WOMEN 249 (1988). Although Burggraf states that "the parental dividend docs not 
preclude a safety net," she would reserve mandatory old-age investments for parents alone. 
BURGGRAF, supra note I, at 80. The implication is that nonparents would have to save for their own 
retirement or fall back on an ungenerous means-tested program. 
9 See BURGGRAF, supra note I, at 69. 
JO See idat69. 
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freighted human functions like childrearing, which are traditionally 
performed within families, can fruitfully be analyzed using this approach. 
The burgeoning field of the economics of the family demonstrates that 
there is a respectable pedigree for this application of the methods of 
economics 12 and Burggrafs book is very much in keeping with this body 
of work. Nevertheless, Burggraf s analysis shares many of the defects 
inherent in trying to apply economic concepts designed primarily to deal 
with market phenomena to the messy and mysterious realms of family life 
and intimate relations. 
Ultimately, however, the book's principal failing lies not in the 
inadequacy of the method but in the dubious premises that the author is 
willing to accept. In particular, her suggestion that her proposed pension 
system reforms will significantly increase investments in children 
necessarily rests on assuming that the current structure of Social Security 
is the principal cause of any putative underinvestment in children. But if 
children are receiving too little of society's time or attention, the most 
important causes almost surely lie elsewhere. And not only is the parental 
dividend no cure for those maladies, but it can be expected to introduce 
fresh difficulties that are as likely to worsen as to improve the welfare of 
future generations. Thus, although Burggraf takes us on a lively and 
exhilarating ride, in the end she fails to make out her case for the parental 
dividend because she leaves out too much, assumes too much, and ignores 
too many potential perverse consequences and practical difficulties. But as 
with many bold proposals that will never see the light of day, Burggrafs 
scheme nonetheless advances our understanding by testing our 
assumptions and forcing us to confront some of our current public welfare 
dilemmas. 
I. Burggrafs Parental Dividend Proposal 
Burggrafs argument rests on the assumption that bearing and raising 
children can be viewed as a form of parental investment. This makes 
economic sense: children require the expenditure of large quantities of 
time and money, both of which have undeniable economic value. 
Economists recognize that children have a dual aspect: they provide 
satisfaction or "consumption" for parents, 13 but they also represent human 
12 See generally G ARY S. BECKER, TREATI SE ON THE FAM ILY ( 1991 ); NANCY R. FOLBRE, 
WHO PAYS FOR TH E KJDS? (1994); ECONOMICS OF THE FAMIL Y: i'v!ARRJAGE, C HILDREN, AN D H UM,.\N 
CAPIT,.\L (Theodore W. Schul tz ed , 1974). 
13 See. e.g ., BECKER, supra note 12, M ARC NERLOVE ET AL ., HOUSEHOLD AN D ECONOMY: 
WELFA RE ECONOM IES OF ENDOGENOUS FERTI LITY ( 1987); Rol f George, On 1/ze Extemal Beneji ls uf 
Children , in 1<.1:-\DRED M.-\TTERS: RETHINKING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FAM ILY 209, 209-17 (DT 
iV!cyer·s et a\. eds , 1987) (desc r ib ing how ec onomists have mode led chil dren pr imarily as :~ 
consumpt ion good). The fact that child reari ng generates a blend of consumpt ion va lue and othe r 
3')Q --' 
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capital, which in tum can produce goods, services, and other forms of 
wealth. 14 That children bring pleasure and satisfaction to their parents does 
not make the idea of children as an investment less valid or less 
heuristically important. On the simplest model, therefore, children serve as 
a kind of black box into which parents and others pour valuable resources 
in the hope and expectation that those investments will yield valuable 
returns. 
The economic model of parental investment must assume 
discoverable relationships between inputs and outputs. Different children 
grow up possessing various amounts of human capital, which presumably 
reflect in some regular and systematic way the amount and quality of the 
inputs invested in them. That human capital is then put to work generating 
payoffs in various contexts, including the labor market. For Burggraf, the 
trouble with current arrangements lies in the relationship between inputs 
and payoffs from childrearing. In our private enterprise system, she argues, 
parents make the lion's share of investments in future generations, but they 
do not receive a fair return on their efforts because the gains from 
enhanced human capital do not redound entirely or even predominantly to 
the parents who bear the costs of creating it. 15 Rather, a large part of those 
gains are externalized or realized by others. 16 Because parents are 
economically rational, their investment decisions, including the amount 
and quality of care that they provide, will be influenced to a significant 
extent by some balance of the monetary costs and expected returns from 
raising children. If payoffs are shunted elsewhere, that balance will be 
thrown off and investments will decline. 
In her attempt to identify the beneficiaries of the gains in human 
capital generated by investments in childrearing, Burggraf focuses almost 
exclusively on children's future value as workers. That is where Social 
Security enters the picture. The taxes workers pay to support any 
mandatory old-age pension system represent the returns on the investment 
that these workers' parents made in their children's future productivity. 
Burggraf's argument runs something like this: because Social Security has 
long since ceased to be an actuarially sound insurance program, its 
continued viability depends on the collective support of the generation of 
workers who are paying into the Social Security fund. Those revenues in 
tum depend on the offspring's efforts and productivity, which generate a 
returns confounds public policy approaches to child development. Since different types of payoffs 
from child welfare are hard to separate, it is not easy to design policies that produce public benefit 
without generating signitlc:lllt "rents" for private gain. See AmyL Wax, Rearing the Next Generation: 
A View from the Economics of Public Finance (unpublished manuscript, on tile with author). 
\4 See George, supra note \J (just because childr-en are consumer durables does not mean 
they cannot be productive capital assets as well). 
15 See BURGGR.-\F, supra note I, at 51 -66. 
16 See id. at 54-66. 
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base for taxation to support the payment of benefits to the parents ' 
generation. But those offspring were produced through the investments of 
individual parents in the recipient group. The rub is that some of the 
beneficiaries invested more than others, but entitlement to returns is tied to 
work record rather than investment. People who never had children, or 
whose children are not productive, can count on the collective support of 
other people's offspring. This amounts to a subsidy flowing from parents, 
and especially "good" parents, to nonparents, or "bad" parents, within the 
same age cohort. 17 According to Burggraf, this structure creates a clear 
disincentive to good parenting on the part of beneficiaries of an old-age 
pension system. 
Burggraf does distinguish between two potential structural effects of 
an old-age pension program. First, it might have antinatalist effects by 
discouraging people from bearing children at all or inducing them to have 
fewer. The simple prediction is that Social Security will depress fertility by 
enhancing the potential to free ride on others' reproductive efforts. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of this effect would almost certainly depend 
on particular social, cultural , and historical conditions such as the ability to 
control fertility and the acceptance of childbearing as a choice . It has been 
suggested that the structure of the pension system may not significantly 
influence birth rates in western industrial societies because fertility rates 
have already bottomed out for other reasons. 18 If this suggestion is correct, 
then perhaps Burggraf is right to devote little attention to anti-natalist 
effects. 19 If it is wrong-that is, if the old-age system does have a 
significant negative effect on fertility rates- then that consequence is 
something to be reckoned with, since it will only exaggerate the trend 
towards the production of fewer future workers to support a large aging 
population, which is a formula for the system's eventual collapse. 
On the first point, Burggraf's consistent emphasis on the productive 
value of children will strike many as presenting a distorted picture of the 
wellsprings of ordinary people ' s decisions to bear and rear children. 
Burggraf acknowledges that parents ' intrinsic and vicarious interest in 
their children 's well-being, represented in the economics lexicon as 
parents ' consumption value, will provide an important brake on wholesale 
parental shirking. But her schema makes little sense unless investment 
17 See id at 95-98. 
18 There is some support fo r the conc lusion tha t Socia l Security has mini ma l anti-natali st 
etl ects in highl y developed industri al soc ieti es that have undergone a dras ti c demographic transiti on. 
See, e.g., Isaac Erli ch & Francis T. Liu , Social Security, The Family, and Economic Growth, 36 ECO N. 
IN QU IRY 390, 404 (\ 998) (stating the expectati on of " little adverse effects [of soc iali zed old-age 
pens ion schemes) on fe rti lity or even sav ings at an advanced stage of development . .. where fertility 
is quite low, so the ma in effect the n wou ld be on human cap ita l accumulation and growth"). 
19 See BURGGRAF, supra note I, at 73 -74 (spec ulat ing that the popu la ti on effec ts wou ld be 
rather small). 
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value tends to swamp consumption value in parents' reproductive calculus. 
Only then can an intervention designed to increase returns on the 
investment component of childrearing be expected to make a significant 
difference to behavior. Whether Burggrafs critical assumption holds, 
however, is anyone's guess. Burggraf s assessment of the balance of 
consumption and concrete investment returns seems to rest primarily on 
history and past social practice rather than on current social reality or 
empirical social science data. Before the creation of modem, centralized, 
mandatory pension programs, children were regarded as parents' major 
source of old-age security?0 Burggraf reasons backwards that, because 
such security was of great value to parents, the fear of being left without 
children ' s support in old age must have strongly motivated parental 
investment in children. 21 But this reasoning fails to satisfy, and we are still 
left wondering whether consumption or investment concerns (or perhaps 
something else entirely) loom largest in most parents' motivational 
structure, whether now or in the past. Even if parents used to depend on 
their children routinely for old-age security and support, the role of that 
dependence in setting parental levels of investment might still have been 
negligible for any number of reasons. Perhaps parents in the past were 
more skeptical about the existence of any important cause and effect 
relationship between parental investment choices and children's 
willingness or ability to support them in old age. Alternatively, parental 
conduct may have been determined by conventions, understandings, or 
individual parental characteristics that in most instances resisted important 
individual variation due to narrowly self-seeking motives. 
Cultural and historical evidence suggests that, at least under some 
circumstances, intergenerational expectations can significantly influence 
parental conduct. For example, there appears to be a connection in some 
societies--China and India come to mind-between the value placed on 
male offspring and sons' responsibility for their parents in old age. 
Although these observations provide cautious support for the view that 
relieving aging parents of reliance on their own children might potentially 
cause parents to neglect them, much more is needed to show whether, and 
to what extent, eliminating socialized old age support would alter parents ' 
behavioral choices in modem Western societies today. In particular, it 
must not be forgotten that myriad alternative options for investing against 
future destitution and bad luck are available to ordinary citizens in the 
industrial west--options that are often out of reach in societies whose 
20 See M IMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE Li VES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLI CY 
FROM COLON IAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 244 ( 1996) (recounting statist ics suggesting that, prior to the 
enactment of the Socia l Security Act, a majority of the elderl y depended on rel atives and friends for 
support). 
21 See BURGGRAF, supra note I, at 65-66. 
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customs are adduced to support the link between old age security and 
parental indulgence. Throwing parents back on the tender mercies of their 
adult children in societies with advanced financial markets might have the 
perverse effect of deflecting resources away from childrearing towards 
other sources of security. 
Considerations of timing alone raise doubts about Burggrafs 
suggestion that the Social Security program has depressed parental 
investment in children, confounding the notion that the old-age pension 
structure significantly affects parental investment patterns. Although 
Social Security has been around since the 1930s, most of the rather cursory 
evidence of declining child well-being that Burggraf musters for the 
proposition that familial investment in children has fallen below desirable 
levels long postdates the creation of the Social Security program. Burggraf 
must explain why the effects that she attributes to the perverse behavioral 
incentives of a mandatory old-age benefit system have only recently been 
felt. 22 
A second defect in the book's approach lies in Burggrafs failure to 
distinguish consistently between different kinds of investment in children. 
At some points she appears to focus quite narrowly on hands-on, direct 
caretaking or "time with children," and even more specifically on parental 
or maternal time with children. At others, she includes those items of 
value (i.e. , private schooling or access to good public schools, private 
lessons, travel, safe neighborhoods, paid childcare services) that depend 
largely on family, community, or government expenditures. Although 
Burggraf does discuss public investment in children, such as spending on 
education,23 on balance she tends to stress private, nongovernmental 
inputs. But her private world of childrearing is curiously impoverished: 
she tends to give short shrift to the nonparental or nonfamilial forms of 
attention-from relatives, neighbors, community leaders, and religious 
figures-and the structures that support the generous, routine provision of 
such attention, which may well be quite crucial to childrens' development. 
In any event, is unclear from her discussion whether she believes that the 
most critical shortfall lies in the provision of hands-on parental caretaking, 
in the falloff in other forms of private investment, or in a decline in 
government spending. And she provides little information from which to 
determine where additional inputs should be concentrated and what mix of 
investments would be best. Finally, as a result of her confusion about what 
she means by investments in children, she does not carefully enough 
unpack the myriad factors-political, economic, cultural, and 
psychological-that differentially determine the amount and quality of 
22 See BURGG RAF, suprnnote l,at212-13. 
23 See id at I 02. 
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investments in children over the broad public-private spectrum. 
Burggraf devotes a good portion of the book to a feminist cri de coeur 
against what she claims is a longstanding disdain for and undervaluation of 
traditional, feminine caretaking work, and she offers some theories as to 
why that role has not been valued at its true worth. 24 Her extended 
discussion of the history and ideology of women's work reinforces the 
reader's sense that her main preoccupation is with a supposed 
underprovision of direct parental attention to children and perhaps even 
more narrowly with a dearth of maternal care. Burggraf appears to believe 
that her commitment to enhancing maternal time with children leads to the 
conclusion that Social Security must be reformed along the lines she 
proposes. The discussion below suggests why that conclusion does not 
follow from her premises. But even apart from that defect in her logic, 
Burggrafs stress on maternal care for children distorts her attempt to 
figure out what is happening to child well-being overall. Although 
unquestionably of great importance, traditional mothering is but one form 
of familial investment in children. Much evidence suggests that more 
general paternal attention, or at least paternal presence, is also important.25 
Moreover, direct care is only one kind of parental resource. Families have 
always made significant financial investments in children in the form of 
things money can buy, and those have traditionally had little to do with the 
mother's role precisely because mothers historically earned very little. 
That portion of parental investment can be traced to resources coming 
from the breadwinner (usually the father) and to decisions, in which 
fathers presumably participate, about how much money to spend on 
children. But those decisions have little to do, at least directly, with the 
peculiarities of the economy's treatment of or attitudes towards women's 
work. If families are spending too little money on their children, or are 
misdirecting the resources they have, the explanations for that behavior 
may differ from the reasons for any supposed undersupply of maternal 
care. For example, in order to spend the money of a breadwinner, there 
needs to be a breadwinner on the premises. Burggraf does give some 
attention to family breakdown and paternal absence as one culprit in a 
decline in investments in children.26 But the potentially great importance 
of paternal inputs in the form of time, money, and family stability suggests 
that the structural undervaluation of women's efforts, contrary to 
Burggrafs implication, may be only a small part of the story she seeks to 
24 See id. at 15-35. 
25 Indeed, Burgrraf herse lf appears to acknow ledge the problem of the lack of pa te rnal ca re. 
Cf id. at 7 (c iting fo rmer Vice President Dan Quayle's speech critic iz in g the telev ision show Murphy 
Brown's glorification of single motherhood , and ac kn owledgi ng that many share hi s conce rns); id. at 
I 09-44 (offerin g proposals to strengthen the institution of m~miage). 
26 See id. at I 09-44. 
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tell. 
The lack of a theory of the relative importance of different forms of 
inputs into child well-being connects with the third defect in Burggrafs 
discussion: her failure to define the conditions that establish a baseline of 
optimal investments in children. Any claim of an undesirable shortfall 
depends on comparing the existing supply to an ideal level of investment 
in children generally and parental caretaking services in particular. But 
how do we know what the right amount would be? This question lurks in 
the background of Burggrafs discussion but does not receive a satisfying 
or systematic analysis. Because Burggraf never identifies the prerequisites 
to the optimal supply of resources to children, she is in danger of going 
astray in her analysis of how to arrange private and public life to insure 
that support will be forthcoming from the right quarters. 
On standard economic accounts, an optimal level of supply of a good 
or service is the level that would result from the intersection of supply and 
demand in a perfectly competitive market. That market will ideally 
produce an outcome that maximizes social utility. Burggraf should 
recognize that any attempt to identify the optimal level of supply of any 
good or service- or any deviation from that level-creates a stark choice: 
either an unregulated market will provide the efficient amount of services, 
or the market will fail to do so for reasons of market failure, in which case 
a regulatory intervention or "fix" may be necessary. Rephrasing this 
question with respect to Burggrafs scheme, the alternatives are: either the 
free market produces the optimal level of childrearing or it does not. 
Burggraf is fundamentally confused about the strengths and 
shortcomings of markets in producing a desirable level of parental 
investment within society as a whole. Burggraf implies that insufficient 
attention to children's needs is the product of a Social Security system that 
separates the costs and benefits of childrearing as it operates in 
combination with a background market distortion in the form of a 
culturally mandated undervaluation of women 's efforts. But that picture 
sits uneasiiy with her insistence that the crisis of parental investment has 
worsened recently, because the customary undervaluation of women's 
work is, if anything, under greater discipliniary pressure from competitive 
market forces now than ever before. Her diagnosis is also inconsistent 
with her own discussion of broader social and economic developments. 
Thus, she stresses the dramatic rise in the costs of raising and educating 
children.27 And she recognizes that skyrocketing costs can be traced in 
large part to the growing opporv .. mity costs of childrearing, which have 
almost everything to do with women's changing roles and brighter 
27 See /d. at 162-68. 
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prospects in, the workplace.28 To the extent that Burgraffs analysis rests on 
an understanding that these developments exaggerate the disparity between 
parental investments and payoffs by increasing the costs of inputs, it is at 
odds with her diagnosis of our dilemma as traceable to a central defect in 
the existing Social Security system, which is that it depresses parental 
returns. 
Indeed, the historical and social developments Burggraf documents 
before proceeding to her reform proposal are largely independent of the 
pension system, and would continue unabated even if Social Security were 
altered or abolished. Burggrafs story is also inconsistent with her 
emphasis on attaching a higher value to women's work. The labor market 
developments she describes are associated with more rather than less 
transactional freedom, which can be expected to produce an economically 
more rational pricing of women's labor. The move towards a free market 
in women's labor is fundamentally inconsistent with a culturally 
conditioned or customary understatement of its value. Yet Burggraf cannot 
have it both ways. She cannot blame the neglect of children on the legacy 
of the "gender cartel" that fails to reward women's labor at its true worth, 
while at the same time tracing this development back to women's progress 
on the labor market, which involves the dissolution of that cartel. 
In the same vein, Burggraf also takes note of the evolution of sexual 
mores and the loosening of marital ties. She fails to see that changes in 
sexual norms generate a significant opportunity cost of their own, 
analogous to that created by women's expanding options in the workplace. 
Just as broader marketplace opportunities for women can be viewed as 
raising the effective price of traditional time-intensive caretaking, 
loosening sexual mores can be viewed as expanding sexual opportunities 
for both parents, but especially for men. This raises the effective pricetag 
on paternal long-term devotion to children and thus makes paternal 
presence and breadwinner investments more costly. 
Although Burggraf recognizes these trends and discerns some of their 
implications, she fails fully to comprehend that the social dynamic that 
results from women's greater participation in paid work and from evolving 
sexual norms implies a conclusion that undermines her focus on Social 
Security reform. Specifically, the transition towards a less regulated 
market both in labor and sexual alliances may itself be responsible for a 
sequence of events that generates less than optimal investment in children. 
How exactly would the transition to more transactional freedom in 
occupational and sexual choice produce the dislocations Burggraf claims? 
One possibility is to admit that children's well-being has indeed declined, 
but to assert that countervailing gains in other quarters have arguably 
28 See id. at 21· 22. 
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produced an increase in net social welfare overall. Greater occupational 
freedom for women, for example, would create new opportunities for 
utility-enhancing transactions on the labor market, which were effectively 
blocked prior to the feminist revolution.29 Absent a complicated story, 
implicating collective effects, to show why such changes might move 
society to a less favorable equilibrium, the utility generated through more 
spontaneous voluntary exchange would be expected to increase social 
welfare. Greater sexual freedom might also spell more personal happiness , 
with a similar effect. The idea that such tradeoffs might actually occur is 
discomfitting for a number of reasons. First, the suggestion is doubly 
problematic in expressly inviting interpersonal comparisons of utility on 
sharply different measures of personal and social welfare and in employing 
elements of well-being that are especially difficult to quantify. Second, the 
candid identification of winners and losers rests on the notion that 
children's well-being might be in significant tension with that of adults 
and even of women-a notion frequently resisted because of the hard, 
value-laden choices it demands. 
It is possible that changes in recent years have produced the best of all 
possible worlds; however, it is also possible that gains have not been 
sufficiently large to offset the effects of any putative falloffs in the level of 
resources channeled to children under the old social strictures. If so, that 
invites an analysis of why social arrangements have evolved to provide 
neither for greater well-being for children nor greater social happiness 
overall. As the discussion below explains more fully, one possibility is that 
the labor market and socio-sexual changes associated with greater freedom 
of choice do not, despite appearances, represent a move to more efficient 
markets, but rather towards a form of market failure that reduces social 
well-being in the aggregate. If that is the case, then the Social Security 
system may have less to do with our current predicament than Burggraf 
suggests, and her proposal for revamping that system less to do with the 
solution than she might hope. 
II. An Undersupply of Parental Care- What Is the Explanation? 
Burggraf s work attempts to connect two complicated social 
phenomena: first, that parents frequently do not receive a fair return on 
their investment in their children;30 and second, that "women's work" in 
the home has historically been undercompensated and undervalued. 31 In 
29 For a disc uss ion of thi s and other themes conce rn ing women in the workpl ace , sec 
geno:: rally Amy L. Wax , Caring Enough: Sex Roles. Work, and Tfn ing Women, 44 Y !LL L. REv. 
(forthcoming 1999). 
30 See BURGGRAF, supm note I , at 94-98 . 
31 See id. ot 43-50 
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focusing on parents ' inadequate returns, she must answer the question of 
who is receiving the lion 's share of the returns. Her background account 
should lead to the conclusion that childrearing potentially generates 
important baseline public goods and positive externalities,32 wholly apart 
from and prior to any governmentally mandated system of old-age support. 
Yet Burggraf never expressly confronts this possibility, choosing instead 
to emphasize the positive externalities generated by the old-age pension 
system. 
Burggrafs failure to link her observations about inadequate parental 
returns on investment to a larger theory of how market forces operate in 
the spheres relevant to childrearing investments leads her to look in the 
wrong places for explanations of why women's traditional activities have 
historically been undercompensated and denigrated. At times, she appears 
to blame ideology, arguing that those in power, including theorists of 
various stripes and self-interested males in general, have persuaded 
themselves that women ' s work is not worth much.33 At other times, she 
blames the fact that most women's work is performed within families, in 
an off-market, unpriced setting. Because there is no real market for these 
vital services, she suggests, it is easy for societies to discount them, 
thereby fueling social and political theories that take women's work for 
granted or leave it out of the picture entirely. 34 Yet neither of these stories 
quite hangs together. As the following discussion suggests, there is an 
alternative account that offers a better explanation for Burggrafs picture 
of social reality. Unfortunately, that account also leads to the conclusion 
that Burggrafs proposed solutions-and her Social Security reform 
scheme in particular-will do little to correct the trends that she finds most 
troubling. 
A. Free Markets in Women's Labor and Externalities of Childrearing 
Time spent caring for children cannot be spent earning money or 
consuming leisure activities. This much has always been true. Within the 
past thirty years or so, however, women have enjoyed a dramatically 
broader range of lucrative opportunities on the labor market. The causes of 
this expansion are unimportant for our purposes. The point is that large 
32 Burggraf assoc iates the idea of children as public goods with Nancy Folbre. See id. at 83-
85 . She nonetheless curiously di smisses public policy recommendations based on Folbre's model as 
imprac ti ca l and thus not worthy of we ighty conside ration. She also seems to confuse the noti on that 
efti cien t allocation req uires that childreari ng cos ts be socialized (i.e. , borne by the me mbers of the 
publ ic who enjoy the be ne ti ts) with proposals to transfer di rec t chi ldreari ng work out of pri va te hands. 
See id. at 84-85. But the first idea , which entai ls on ly some form of public subsidy or support, does not 
necessarily entai l the other, whic h goes to the organ iza ti on of carc giving. 
33 See id at 39-4 1, 182-83. 
34 See id. at 188-90. 
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numbers of women have for the first time been permitted to engage in 
activities and to occupy social roles formerly reserved for men.35 
These changes were made possible and considerably hastened by the 
creation of modem labor markets. According to the neoclassical account, 
returns to labor are in large part determined by supply and demand.36 A 
given quantity of labor is rewarded at a particular price or wage that 
reflects its economic value. The economic value reflects demand on the 
market as well as labor productivity, which is a function of ability, 
industry, and training. Until recently, the market for men's labor, although 
always far from perfectly competitive, was considerably more "free" and 
rational (that is, responsive to workers' actual economic productivity) than 
the market for women's work. Indeed, until very recently no society has 
seen fit to release women onto the labor market to compete alongside men 
by selling their labor to the highest bidder on approximately equal terms. 
Rather, equal employment opportunity by sex was rejected, in theory and 
practice, by virtually every society worldwide. 
Various formal and informal strategies were traditionally employed to 
limit women's labor market currency.37 In this century at least, informal 
customs or norms surely have been more important than law as the source 
of restrictions on the labor market choices of women. Burggraf accurately 
calls these restrictions a "caste system. "38 The disapproval that label 
implies, however, blinds Burggraf to the functions performed by social 
norms in general and the norms and practices that comprise the gender 
caste system in particular. Traditional gender role norms are a 
comprehensive system of social regulation designed to restrict the 
transactions into which individuals might otherwise freely enter if 
motivated purely by self-interest. 39 Burggraf never stops to consider the 
dynamic behind the nearly universal phenomenon of distinct gender roles. 
Why have societies worldwide and throughout history adopted a set of 
35 I develop the ideas in this section in greater detail in Wax, supra note 31. 
36 See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73, 91-93, 131-38 
(1998) (describing neoclassical labor market models and critiques of those models). 
37 See, e.g., SUSAN PEDERSEN, FAMILY DEPENDENCE AND THE 0RJGJNS OF THE WELFARE 
STATE: 8RJTAIN AND FRANCE 1914-1945 ( 1993) (otTering a historical perspective); Mary Anne Case, 
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Male in the Law and 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. I (1995) (discussing sex role conventions). In modem times, 
the most important devices have been informal customs that either make some work unavailable to 
women or make performing it less economically rewarding for them. It was simply understood that 
some jobs belonged to or suited men, and that women should not be hired to perform them. Men would 
not permit their wives to work after marriage; to have a working wife was considered a source of 
shame. For a man to work under a female boss was considered unthinkably degrading. Women were 
routinely paid less than men for the same work. All these conventions were widely accepted and rarely 
questioned or de tied. See generally Wax, supra note 31; Wax, supra note 13. 
3S Sec BURGGRAF, supra note I , at 3-4. 
39 For a more extended discussion , see Wax, supra note 31; Wax, supra note 13. On norms 
gc:nnally, sc:c: Richard li McAdams. The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338 (1992) . 
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social mores and customs that reject a laissez fa ire approach to women's 
productive efforts and tightly restrict the sphere of women's legitimate 
social activities? Why have societies also uniformly frowned on the very 
notion of a free market in women 's work? 
One answer is presented by the defects that economists have 
identified as commonly accepted sources of market failure . Among the 
traditionally recognized conditions for market failure are the creation of 
public goods and the generation of positive or negative externalities.40 
Thus, if Burggraf is right that there is currently a suboptimal 
underprovision of hands-on parenting, then a theory of positive 
externalities and public goods may explain it. 
It is commonly accepted that imperfectly compet1t1ve markets can 
result when activities generate negative externalities.41 If services 
traditionally supplied by women, most notably the direct care of children, 
tend to generate significant positive externalities, one would expect these 
services to be undersupplied in an otherwise unregulated market for 
women's labor. Specifically, externalities might systematically distort the 
demand for women's labor on the paid market and at home and alter the 
balance between the two sectors . This shift rather idealistically assumes 
that women's labor on the paid market is priced at its full value; that there 
are no other factors such as discrimination or market norms distorting the 
market price.42 The uncompensated benefit from nurturing work would 
40 See infra note 24. 
41 See, e.g., FRANCISCO CABRILLO, THE ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY AND FAMILY POLICY 
146-54 ( 1999); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 25-2 8 ( 1990); NERLOVE, ET AL. , supra note 
13 , at 37-43. Publi c finance theory predicts that, when investments or transactions create negative 
externalities, that is, when they impose costs on third parties, the market will generate too much of a 
commodity or service at the price fixed by the market. Only if the true costs of the activity are 
internali zed to the transaction will the pa1ties generate the optimal amount. Likewise, when an activity 
generates posit ive externalities , that is, when it creates benefits for strangers to the transaction or 
otherwise impedes fair compensation fo r the producer, the market will generate too little of the 
commodity or serv ice. Speci fic al ly, the theory predicts that productive labor that creates positive 
externalities wi ll be undersupplied relative to some socially optimal output. In more practical terms, 
workers whose labor generates positive externalities will tend to reduce their amount of effort because 
the returns they enjoy wi ll fai l to refl ect the full measure of its social val ue. People other than the 
supplier will obta in some of those benefits gratui tously-they wi ll free ride on the transaction. The 
returns to the worker wi ll be artificially depressed relat ive to what a perfectly competitive market 
would generate. 
42 Thi s account is not meant to rul e out additional forc es that might lower returns to 
women's work within the domestic sphere. The dynamics of bargaining between couples within the 
marital relationship, which can be modeled as a bilateral monopol y, can affect women's returns on 
investments within the family and could potential ly compound (or compensate for) the shortfall in 
returns created by the interplay of the domestic and paid work sphere. There is reason to believe, 
however, that marriage introduces severe impediments on women's abili ty to receive a fair return on 
their labor outs ide the paid workplace and thus may reduce the rewards of domest ic activity eve n 
further in many cases. See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in che Shadow of che Markee: Is There a Fwure 
for Egalitarian Marriage 7 , 84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998). The difficulty of predicting the outcomes of 
the dynamics of intrafami li al allocations adds complexity to the interpl ay between the marital unit and 
external markets for labor and confounds any attempt to analyze tradeoffs between parenting time and 
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then artificially depress effective demand for those services relative to the 
equilibrium demand for other uses of women 's time. The reduction in 
effective demand for caring work would diminish the rewards to those 
performing such tasks and hence depress the supply of those willing to 
perform the services. This would shift the overall balance of effort away 
from nurturing. If women get significantly more accurate returns on 
investment in the paid labor market, participation in the domestic sphere 
will decline. 
A number of theorists have suggested that unpaid, off-market 
childrearing work potentially creates positive externalities of various 
kinds. 43 It is quite difficult to detennine the exact nature of these benefits 
and whether the magnitude of these externalities is significant enough to 
influence behavior.44 Nonetheless, two basic intuitions support the 
conclusion that childrearing produces important generalized social 
benefits. First, the continued existence of society in any form requires that 
some number of children be born and raised to maturity. Although many 
complex factors, perhaps including the structure of any old-age pension 
program, might affect how many children a given society would be best off 
producing, there is no question that everyone gains if some people take on 
the parental role. Second, society as a whole is better off if children who 
are born grow up to be industrious, law abiding, sober, moral, mentally 
and physically healthy, conscientious, creative, educated, and skilled 
citizens. Assuming for the sake of argument that the resources that parents 
invest in childrearing have some important relationship to how children 
tum out, then there is collective interest in the incentives parents face for 
good or ill in the performance of their childrearing duties. 
Yet another type of externality generated by childrearing potentially 
shifts the allocation of parents' resources in general and the allocation of 
women 's labor in particular. The human capital generated by parental 
investment redounds not only to the collective benefit of society as a 
whole but also to the benefit of the individual children. Although parents 
have a considerable interest in their children's well-being-as represented 
by parental "consumption value"-there is still less than a complete 
identity of interests. If some resources conferred on children by parents are 
pure gift because parents receive no compensation in the form of 
consumption value or otherwise, economic theory predicts that those 
resources will be underprovided relative to some optimal amount. 
My immediate concern is not to speculate on how to solve the 
time devoted to paid work. 
43 See. e.g., CABRILLO, supra note 43 ; NERLOVE, supra note 13; ERJC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL 
JUSTICE 149-55 ( 199 1 ) ; SCHULZ, supra note 12; Shirley P. Burggraf, How Should the Costs of Child 
Rearing Be Distributed?, CHALLENGE, Sept .-Oct. 1993, at 48-55; George, supra note 13. 
44 For more on thi s topi c, see Wax, supra note 13. 
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problems of positive externalities and market failure that potentially 
deform the supply of good care for children. Rather, it is to posit a 
relationship between these imperfections and the devices that societies 
have historically evolved to deal with them. As noted, the theory of 
externalities predicts that hands-on nurturing of children will be 
undersupplied relative to some socially optimal level. But that undersupply 
will only occur in a market that, apart from the noted defects, is otherwise 
economically competitive, permitting women's labor on behalf of children 
to compete without interference with other valuable uses of women's time, 
including most notably paid market work. But one way to deal with 
undersupply is to reduce the level of competition for women's time and 
effort by reducing the returns to alternative allocations of labor.45 The 
types of devices societies have employed to accomplish this result have 
been rehearsed elsewhere. The effect of these devices will be to depress 
the demand for women's paid labor overall, thus lowering the price, or 
wage, on women's labor performed for pay, which depresses returns to 
women workers from market work. If compensation from paid work is 
artificially reduced, women will supply less of it relative to the 
alternatives, which include domestic activities. 
If this story is accepted, the gender caste system that Burggraf 
deplores should be seen in a different light. The customs and practices 
regulating sex roles should be viewed as a concerted response to the 
market failure that results from the positive externalities of caring for 
children. Although a free market for women's labor would appear to be 
efficient, that appearance is fundamentally mistaken. Uncompensated 
benefits to third parties potentially interfere with efficient allocations of 
labor on an unregulated market. 
This is not to say that there are no possible alternative accounts of 
how women have found themselves providing valuable services for 
inadequate compensation or without monetary compensation of any kind. 
One explanation is a variation on pure rent-seeking. Men have banded 
together to use collective force to extract value from women on behalf of 
themselves and children, but not necessarily within an arrangement that is 
socially efficient. But why would societies that indulge such inefficiencies 
survive and thrive? Alternatively, specialization creates compensating 
advantages that might be efficient.46 But then why haven't societies simply 
45 See Wax, supra note 31. For example, societies develop "dual labor markets" in which 
women are artificially confined, by custom and practice, to a limited number of occupations; ordain 
price discrimination in the form of lower wages for women, regardless of productivity; create a 
marriage bar, which drastically raises the price (forgoing marriage) of staying in the paid labor market; 
and create a taboo that views a working wife as a badge of shame. For a more extensive discussion of 
gender role norms, see id. 
46 See Gary S. Becker, Human Capital. Effort. and 1/ze Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. 
ECON S33-S58 ( 1985). 
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chosen to bribe women to adopt roles that lead to the most socially 
efficient result, rather than restricting the choices they are permitted to 
make, thus incurring the costs of blocking voluntary utility-enhancing 
transactions?47 The final alternative looks to externalities . Restrictive 
gender customs serve to shift incentives to correct for spontaneous 
undersupply. Thus, what some have suspected all along is confirmed: 
societies have devised ways to force women to sacrifice for the greater 
good.48 Although the externalities of parenting and childrearing are elusive 
and difficult to measure, this story has the virtue of explaining the 
universality, perdurability, and remarkable stability of gender role 
restrictions.49 
In sum, what Burggraf misses is the possibility that the gender caste 
system she criticizes is not the source of the undercompensation of caring 
work, but rather has evolved as a response to it. She blames the domestic 
confinement of women under a gender caste system for undervaluing 
traditional nurturing activities: If only women's services were fully priced, 
women would be paid what they are worth and the undersupply problem 
would disappear. But a moment's reflection shows what is wrong with that 
story: Giving women fewer alternatives would be expected to increase the 
supply of nurturing services, not decrease it, by lowering the opportunity 
cost of engaging in those activities and by decreasing the rewards of 
alternative efforts. The market is the source, not the solution, for the 
undervaluation and underprovision of childrearing. And the ideology of 
the gender caste system merely reflects and rationalizes the market failures 
that make it necessary. 
B. Will a Parental Dividend Solve Undersupply? 
The question of whether an adequate supply of parental time with 
children would be realized under the baseline conditions of a free, gender-
blind market for wage labor is of vital importance in evaluating Burggraf's 
proposal for Social Security reform. Although Burggraf is concerned with 
the full range of parental investments in children, she clearly views direct 
parental care as a key guarantor of children's healthy and productive 
futures. But Burggraf's parental dividend program will make a significant 
47 For a di sc ussion of these alternatives, see Wax, supra note 31. 
48 To a lesser extent , men (in their role as fathers) have been forced to sacrifice as well. A 
parallel story could be told about the benefits extracted from men in favor of children and society by 
customs restricting men's marital choices and sexual fre edom. Those mores have proven as universal , 
stable, and perdurable as gender restrictions. 
49 It does not begin to explain , however, how such gender role conventions actually came to 
be de veloped and adopted- tha t is, it explains their rationale but not the steps in their genesi s. For a 
general discussion of the origin of norms (and ge nder role norms in particular), see McAdams, supra 
note 41 , at 379 & n. l41. 
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difference in the supply of the parental services she deems vital only if 
Social Security is responsible for a significant portion of the downward 
pressure on those efforts. Even if Social Security were abolished altogether 
and the externalized component of support for childless contemporaries 
disappeared, it would not follow that more mothers would stay home or 
that parents would cut back their hours at work. Declaring a parental 
dividend, although it may return some resources to parents, does nothing 
to address the principal sources of the rising opportunity costs of bearing 
and raising children. Likewise, that reform will not bring back the social 
and sexual norms concerning divorce, adultery, premarital cohabitation, 
and serial monogamy that served as important bulwarks against the erosion 
of continuing paternal investment in children by stabilizing two-parent 
families and by facilitating the division of labor that permitted women to 
devote time to caretaking.50 Even if Social Security may slightly 
exacerbate the shortages that the liberalization of norms has caused, 
reforming that system as Burggraf suggests will neither reverse these 
developments nor address their root causes. Indeed, Burggrafs conclusion 
that the exploding opportunity cost of childrearing has exacerbated a crisis 
that can be laid at the feet of a perverse old-age pension system almost 
certainly gets the relationship backwards. The old-age pension system has 
come to function as the principal backstop against a shortage in parental 
investment that can be traced back to the social changes associated with 
the triumph of feminism and the sexual revolution. Although the economic 
developments that have resulted in the liberation of women have unleashed 
the very changes, including most notably demographic implosion in 
advanced industrial countries, that have threatened the Social Security 
system with collapse,51 those forces are the outgrowth neither of that 
program's creation nor of its peculiar design. It follows that Social 
Security reform cannot plausibly function as the principal agent of 
restoring the family to its prior place of cultural and social primacy or of 
elevating children's level of well-being to some better or higher level that 
presumably prevailed in the past. 
The cogency of Burggrafs particular proposal is especially doubtful 
because its sole focus is on the privatization of returns , rather than the 
socialization of costs. It thus addresses itself to, at best, half of the 
problem. The potentially troublesome and market-failure-inducing 
50 Burggraf does discuss di vorce reform as one component of a comprehensive program to 
stabi li ze the family . See BURGGRAF, supra note I , at 109-44. For example, she suggests including 
earnin g capaci ty in the marital property that is di vided between spouses upon the dissolution of 
marriage. See id. at 136. Her discuss ion of famil y stability, however, includes a very heavy emphas is 
on changing the way in wh ich fa mily resources are all ocated fo r old-age support . See id. at 138-39. 
5 1 See generally PETER G. PETERSON, WILL AM ERICAN GROW UP BEFORE IT GROWS OLD'l 
HOW THE COMING SOCIA L SECURJTY CRIS IS TH REATENS YOU, YOUR FAMILY, AND YOUR COUNTRY 
(1996). 
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externalities from hands-on caring work and other forms of onerous 
parental investment fall into two distinct categories: the purely altruistic 
benefits to children for which parents, by definition, receive no 
recompense; and the dispersed and generalized social benefits from the 
rearing of industrious, upstanding citizens, which take the form mainly 
(although not solely) of public goods. The proper corrective for each type 
of potentially market-distorting externality is not the same. Burggraf's 
solution to both problems is, in effect, to accomplish the privatization of 
old-age security52 by closing the circle of family interdependence that is 
breached by the structural barriers that impede efficient, spontaneous 
transactions between contiguous generations. Burggraf suggests that if 
parents are forced to look to their own children as a hedge against 
destitution and abandonment, they will have an important incentive to 
invest wisely in their children's upbringing. 53 In effect, the benefits 
externalized to children will be internalized to the investor. But that effect 
addresses only that portion of the undersupply and undercompensation 
problem that can be traced to uncompensated gifts to the next generation. 
(And the parental dividend is a far from perfect solution even to that aspect 
of the problem.54) It does not touch the socialized portion of the 
undersupply, which may be built into the very nature of the childrearing 
function itself. Although the parental dividend will produce a larger 
payback from benefits flowing to individual parents' own children, some 
portion of uncompensated benefits will still go to society as a whole. The 
conditions for a free ride on a public good will still persist. 
In sum, the skyrocketing opportunity cost of having and supporting 
children that has followed the collapse of the gender caste system is the 
prime suspect in any attempt to explain a decline in investments in the next 
generation. Those shifts in norms and social practices have had their main 
impact on the reproductive choices and attitudes of women. Added to that 
are the loosening restrictions on sexual adventurism, divorce, and serial 
monogamy- developments which have greatly increased the opportunity 
costs of hewing to the stable arrangements that arguably provide the best 
52 There has been much talk of various proposals to privatize Social Security. The essence 
of most privatization proposals is a plan to substitute investments in private capital markets 
(specifically, the stock market) for the maintenance by the govemmment of a pool of funds for 
payment of liabilities incurred under the terms of the program. Under some proposals, the government 
would manage the private investment of an aggregative fund into which beneficiaries would pay a 
mandated amount. See Peter Diamond, Sound Investment, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 9, 1998 , at 18 . Other 
proposals contain an additional element of privati zation, in that each recipient would be permitted to 
maintain a persona l fund , whic h he or she would manage under loose regulatory guidelines. The latter 
programs effectively aboli sh the progressively redi stribut ive elemen t currently built into the program, 
and undem1ine the el emen t of insurance against individuali zed risk of bad investmen ts that is inherent 
in the pooled manage ment of funds. See .Jonathan Chait, Security Risk, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 18, 1999, 
at 20. 
53 See BURGGRAF, supra note i, at 69-85. 
5..:\ See infra Part IV . 
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setting for bringing up children and producing lots of them. Whether the 
behavioral shifts induced by these phenomena swamp those created by 
Social Security's guarantee of freedom from an insecure old age is 
ultimately an empirical question. But if the effects of the collapse of the 
sexual and labor market cartels are greater than the effects of the modern 
erosion of the intergenerational compact-which they almost certainly 
are-then moving to a parental dividend will not change the level of 
parental investment very much. 
III. Indulging the Nurture Assumption 
As noted above, Burggrafs parental dividend proposal falls short by 
failing adequately to address the component of external benefit from 
childrearing that is broadly socialized-a component that is difficult to 
quantify but that evidence suggests may be substantial. At best, her 
proposal is designed to address the effects of benefits conferred on the 
particular children who have received parental care. But even as an attempt 
to internalize the externality traceable to uncompensated parental gifts, the 
proposal is seriously flawed. Despite our commonsense notions about the 
relationship between good parenting and positive outcomes for children, it 
is difficult to identify and measure the benefits or payoffs of all forms of 
parental investments in children, including direct parental care, because 
the causal links are not well established. The proposition that there is some 
regular correspondence between the inputs and outputs of childrearing has 
tremendous appeal and is almost certainly true at the extremes, but 
demonstrating the importance of small shifts in the quantity and quality of 
parental investment or behavior over most of the range ordinarily found 
within modem industrial societies is quite problematic. Even more difficult 
is the task of demonstrating a correlation between socially significant 
differences in outcomes and the amount of direct parental care as 
compared to care by paid surrogates.55 Thus, gender role nonns that force 
or encourage mothers to care for their own offspring may not be necessary 
to provide for the optimal care of children. If paid caretakers could 
potentially do just as well, attention should shift away from strategies for 
luring women back into the home and towards trying to alter daycare 
purchase decisions or to improve the quality of paid childcare . 56 
55 See. e.g., Michael Lamb, Nonparental Child Care: Context. Quality, Correlates, and 
Consequences, in 4 HA NDB OOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: CH ILD PSYCHOLOGY IN PRACTICE (William 
Damon et al. eds. , 1997) (d iscussing equ ivocal soc ial sc ience ev idence on the effects of nonparental 
childcare and pa id chi ldcare services); SUSAN OIIRA, A MOTH ER'S PL ACE: CHOOSING WORK AND 
FAMILY WITHOUT GUlL T OR BLAME ( 1999) (citing Michael Lamb and discussing the effects of 
childcare) . 
56 See, e.g., Al ison Blau & David Hagy, The Demand for Quality in Child Care, 106 J. POL. 
ECO~ 104 ( 1993) (sugg~sting that parents are not very interested in trading up to more expensive 
childcare). That is not to say that the pote nt ial equ ivalence of pa id and parental care for many of a 
ch il d' s waking hours necessari ly makes the potential problem of inadequate parenta l in vest ment in 
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Burggrafs discussion of the caring crisis and her proposal for 
creation of a parental dividend, rests on a fundamental premise about the 
role of parents in their children's lives. If the premise is invalid, her 
argument loses much of its cogency and force. The mere content of 
Burggrafs proposal makes clear that she adopts some version of what 
psychologist Judith Harris has recently called the "nurture assumption": 
because parents provide the environment in which children grow up, 
parents have "a real power over the sort of people their children will tum 
out to be."57 
The nurture assumption can be unpacked into a sequence of 
understandings about child development, the role of parents, and the 
efficacy of public policy in influencing outcomes for children. First, there 
exists a regular, systematic, and demonstrable causal relationship between 
the choices that parents make in rearing their children and how those 
children tum out as adults. It is therefore possible to develop something 
like a science of childrearing, which rests on the discovery of the rules 
linking parental conduct to results. That science can be harnessed to guide 
parental behavior. Second, the behavior of a child's individual parents is 
the most important factor in how that child develops. This is an 
assumption about the relative magnitude of effects, based on a belief that 
parents have a greater role in influencing a child's development than 
countless other factors, including what children watch on television; the 
mores of friends or peers; the presence, number, and character of siblings; 
the educational philosophy of the child's school; heredity; or even luck. 
Third, children ' s character, behavior, skills, personality, and ability are 
within parents' deliberate control. They are not simply a matter of fixed 
traits or background characteristics that parents bring to the childrearing 
role. Thus, parents can determine whether their children's future behavior 
will be socially desirable or undesirable, socially constructive or 
destructive. Fourth, because child development is a function of parents' 
chosen conduct, public policy can influence parental behavior to produce 
better outcomes for children by bringing to bear the right incentives and by 
providing parents with the proper resources . 
The failure of any of these assumptions casts serious doubt on 
Burggrafs proposal and on any broader investment model that depends on 
the existence of a systematic and predictable causal relationship between 
parental investments and the development of children's human capital. Yet 
there is reason to question the tenets of this model. By claiming to show 
that the causal links between certain kinds of inputs and outputs in the 
childrearing game are not well established, the psychologist Judith Harris 
casts doubt on the conclusion that parents can control or minimize the risks 
children go away. Rather, it would onl y shift the debate to whether the supposed externaliti es of 
childrearing would lead wage earning parents to skimp on the quality of the childcare services that they 
purchase fo r their ch il dren . 
57 JUDITH HARRIS, TH E N URTURE ASSU t\IPTI ON 2 ( 1998) . 
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of bad outcomes by adopting certain investment strategies.58 Although 
there is a high degree of correlation between certain parental 
characteristics and children's traits and behavior, there is a remarkable 
paucity of data to distinguish between correlations due to fixed traits (such 
as heredity) or linked circumstances (such as intelligent peers and parental 
education), and the direct effects of parents' childrearing strategies. The 
principal factors that determine child outcomes are either unknown 
because we are as yet ignorant of the causal rules, or not under parents' 
control because independent of parents' deliberate childrearing choices. 
Burggraf s parental dividend scheme necessarily envisions parents making 
childrearing decisions that will result in monetary payoffs that are 
correlated systematically with the value of the resources expended. This 
will happen only if more or better parental investment tends to increase the 
value of the parental dividend fund, which in tum will occur only if certain 
conditions hold. First, proper parental inputs will tend to create more 
productive citizens. Those citizens will earn higher incomes and pay more 
money into parents' retirement accounts. Second, parents must know 
which kinds of investments produce this effect. They must believe, for 
example, that if they supervise their children more conscientiously, read to 
them, teach them, play with them, take them to museums and on camping 
trips, eschew long work hours and excessive careerism, banish selfishness, 
and renounce serial monogamy and sexual adventurism, their children will 
reward them with higher incomes in the future. Thus, parents must 
explicitly or implicitly embrace the "nature assumption." And that 
assumption must be correct. 
Burggrafs behavioral predictions simply will not work if these 
conditions do not hold or if any of the effects are swamped by other 
factors. Even if there is a regular causal link between parental choices and 
child outcomes, the signal of the parental dividend must be large enough to 
rise above the noise of other elements, such as occupational or sexual 
opportunity costs, or the magnitude of parents' consumption value relative 
to investment value, that tend either to discourage or encourage 
investments in children. And a causal relationship, even if present, does 
not guarantee a large effect. The validity of the nurture assumption tells us 
nothing about the elasticity of the investment-output relationship. Massive 
increases in parental inputs may be necessary to produce rather small 
improvements in future productivity. For these reasons, the effective 
incentives the parental dividend creates for parents to improve the quality 
or quantity of investment may be marginal at best. 
In sum, the fundamental problem with Burggrafs proposal is that 
there is remarkably little evidence that, above and beyond insuring that a 
minimum baseline of physical and emotional needs are met, parental 
choices lead in any demonstrable way to the production of better or worse 
5S St> e id. 
348 
Is There a Caring Crisis? 
children. 59 Moreover, economic success in the marketplace and the ability 
to demand high pay is hardly the only measure of a successful adult or 
child. An additional step is necessary to conclude that variations within the 
normal range of parental behavior will reliably result in higher earnings, as 
opposed to other outcomes that are socially valuable or desired by parents 
and children. 
As an attempt to bring an economic paradigm to the childrearing 
function, the human capital investment framework is not necessarily a 
mistake . The model may lead us astray, however, by implying a degree of 
control and predictability that is belied by our poor understanding of the 
principals of child development and by the facts. That predictability is 
essential if Burggrafs parental dividend proposal is to have any chance of 
making a significant difference in the lives of children. For even if, as 
Burggraf predicts , parents really will invest more in children in 
anticipation of greater returns on their investment through the parental 
dividend device, that expectation will not be fulfilled unless parents' belief 
in the efficacy oftheir own enhanced contribution is grounded in reality. 
IV. The Nurture Assumption and the Risks of Childrearing 
Burggrafs parental dividend proposal implicitly assumes that 
childrearing can be made a low-risk undertaking by establishing a structure 
that requires children to support their own parents. But if childrearing is 
inherently a high-risk proposition, that assumption fails. Indeed, the 
foregoing discussion suggests that investments in children may be among 
the riskiest that a person can choose to make . There is no guarantee, 
despite best efforts, that children will tum out well rather than badly. They 
may grow up to be incompetent or ineffectual, or may die, fall sick, go 
insane, or run afoul of the law. Even if children are capable of supporting 
their elderly parents, they may refuse to do so out of ingratitude or cold-
heartedness , or simply because they insist upon following a life plan (as a 
starving artist, perhaps) that is incompatible with providing much help. 
Attempts to solve this problem by contractual mechanisms face "first 
mover" problems and other structural impediments created by the time lag 
between investment and payoff and by contractual incapacity due to 
children ' s immaturity during the period when the most intensive parental 
investments must be made. Societies have attempted to cope with the risk 
of contractual failure through various informal mechanisms, including 
strong norms of filial duty and obligations of parental support in old age. 
However, those norms were never a perfect guarantee against bad luck and 
defiant ingratitude and have succumbed in part to modem conditions. 
Indeed, the rise of governmentally mandated old-age programs and their 
59 See id, at 44. 
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ascendant political popularity almost certainly can be traced in part to the 
erosion of conventions that helped parents secure their children's future 
60 support. 
The notion that childrearing is a highly risky endeavor bears on why 
old-age insurance is considered so valuable and on whether Burggrafs 
proposal is a good substitute for what we already have. Social Security 
may best be understood not as a general form of insurance against 
destitution in old age, but as a hedge against the failures of our investments 
in children. In other words, Social Security's principal function is to 
protect us against the risk that, despite best efforts, we will be left bereft by 
selfish, ungrateful, or incompetent offspring. 61 If the nurture assumption is 
largely illusory, there may be no other way effectively to insure against 
that risk except having no children at all and deflecting our resources 
elsewhere. 
Burggrafs proposal provides the worst of insurance worlds by 
making one type of insurance mandatory (thus limiting substitution away 
to various options that are more responsive to individual circumstances 
and risk averseness) while failing to insure against the most intransigent 
risk of all. The program leaves parents completely vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of child outcomes, against which they may need and want 
protection. 62 Assuming that little can be done to reduce the risk that 
parents' investments in children will go bad, the parental dividend's failure 
to mitigate those risks may in some cases have the perverse effects of 
discouraging childbearing or causing parents to shunt resources away from 
existing children in favor of alternative investment strategies, such as 
retirement accounts, that are more likely to yield a reliable return. 
Moreover, the very same intransigence that makes insurance against the 
risks inherent in parenthood so valuable would also serve as a hedge 
against any moral hazard from protecting parents against the consequences 
of producing bad children. If the nurture assumption has little bite over the 
range of behaviors at issue-if there is no systematic and reliable 
relationship between parental investments beyond the decent minimum 
and children's future productivity or pathology-it is hard to see why 
society has much practical interest in blocking the formation of a pooled 
insurance fund that allows members of a generation to draw against the 
60 It has bee n argued, however, that the causation runs in the other direction; that is to say, 
tha t Soc ial Security has helped to erode those conventions. See, e.g., DAVID FRUM, DEAD RIGHT 193-
94 ( 1994 ): Jenn ifer Roback Morse , Chopping the Family Tree, FORBES, Oct. 5, 1998, at 86. 
61 For a di scuss ion of the difficulties that could be expected to attend the development of 
huma n cap1 tal marke ts across generati ons (including ri sks inherent in the time lag, the problem of the 
in ab ility to contract due to the immaturity of children, and the risk inherent in the vicissitudes of the 
outcomes of chil drca ring) , see Wax, supra note 31. 
62 Burggraf does sugges t the creati on of a means-tested subsistence benefit program for the 
child less or for parents whose offs pring fai l them completely. See BURGGRAF, supra note 1, at 80-81. 
But th:~ t pmgra m is intended to be de minim us under her sc heme. 
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efforts of others. 63 Even if Social Security induces some marginal 
disinvestment in children due to diminished parental concern about how 
their children will tum out, this behavior may nevertheless produce little 
systematic effect on overall social well-being. The premise of moral 
hazard is that behavioral incentives affect behavior and that behavior 
makes a difference . In the case of parent-child relations, that difference 
may not hold, or the relationship may simply be too weak to matter. 
V. Other Benefits of Social Security Foregone 
In addition to sacrificing much-prized insurance against lack of 
effective control over child outcomes, Burggrafs program fails to deliver 
other valuable benefits of the Social Security program as currently 
structured. Socialized pension benefits provide independence that is 
precious to children and parents alike. Mutual dependence, whatever its 
potential payoffs, entails a distinctive sacrifice of freedom, and freedom is 
valuable in itself. Social Security has not meant that children need not 
worry about their parents nor parents about their children. But neither 
parents nor children need worry nearly so much. This freedom permits 
children to make choices or develop life plans that are fundamentally 
incompatible with primary responsibility for their aged parents' well-being 
and livelihood. 64 Likewise, parents are less concerned about their 
children' s economic fate or about maintaining amicable relations with 
them. To be sure, Burggrafs proposal potentially mitigates parents ' 
concern with staying on their children's good side by mandating financial 
support out of children's own earnings. Parents will nonetheless still retain 
a strong interest in controlling economic aspects of their grown children's 
lives and will be tempted to push children into jobs or careers with bigger 
monetary payoffs in the market, regardless of talents or interests. But it is 
precisely from the incentive to force children into a course that will not 
promote their happiness that parents might wish to be free. Parents may 
63 As Kenneth Abraham has observed: 
Few people in our society object, on grounds of fairness, that the amount of risk distribution 
peopl e choose to have through private insurance is excessive. No one thinks it is unfair or 
immoral that people do not have to bear all the risks of their activities. If we are ever concerned 
tha t people have chosen to share risk excessively, our concerns are grounded in reasons of 
effic iency and loss preventi on. Our society worri es li ttle if at all that we tamper with fate by 
purchasing insuranc e coverage. 
KENNETH S Al3RAHA\I, DISTRIB UT ING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLI C POLICY 18 
(1986). 
(J'l For a sensitive discuss ion of this point and othe rs pertinent to the mr.dcm we lfare slate's 
balance between independence and conn e<: t e dne~;s, see Jeremy Waldron , IVhcn Justice Replaces 
Affection. The Nccrlfor l?igh:s, in 'N,\LDRmJ, LiflERj\L RIGHTS ( 1993). 
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prefer their children to pursue their own interests and therefore would not 
wish to participate in a system that might strengthen incentives to frustrate 
that preference. A socialized system of old-age support allows parents to 
confer the gift of disinterest in their children's choice of career. That 
benefit may be lost if Burggraf s parental dividend proposal is adopted. 
The same point applies to the effect the parental dividend is likely to 
have on such social practices as children taking the time to " find 
themselves" by prolonging their education, engaging in extensive travel or 
leisurely pursuits, or hopping from job to job. Some young people may be 
more reluctant to engage in these strategies for fear of depriving their 
parents. It is more likely, however, that parents will respond to the 
financial incentive to nag, steer, or pressure their children prematurely into 
moneymaking endeavors. In addition to sacrificing children's (and 
parents ') consumption value from alternative pursuits, this steering (if 
effective) may be inefficient in the long run. The imperative to hurry up 
and make money may result in an inferior match of people and 
65 employment. 
Burggrafs proposal is also problematic in its unavoidable emphasis 
on the monetary value of children's activities. The proposal selectively 
recognizes only the element of parental work or investment that generates 
monetary returns, because the parental dividend fund necessarily contains 
only cash. Moreover, the monetary returns must take the form of taxable 
earnings or income to the child, which in itself raises the specter of asset 
shuffling and sheltering galore. That Burggrafs proposal takes account 
only of pecuniary returns has a number of paradoxical and perverse 
consequences. First, the job market may feel some effects. Well paying 
positions will attract even more applicants. Jobs that pay less will see a 
drop in the supply of well trained and capable workers. That result may 
well add to the devaluation of traditional female functions. It is ironic that 
low paying jobs, which often tend to be associated with femininity and 
caretaking roles, may go begging under a proposal that seeks to reward the 
type of "women's work" that is claimed to be undercompensated, 
underappreciated, or denigrated under current arrangements. 
This effect will find its most extreme expression in parents' likely 
attitude towards children who elect to stay out of the labor market 
altogether in favor of full-time caretaking. Those children will, of course, 
be disproportionately female. Since full-time mothers and homemakers 
will pay nothing into the parental dividend fund, parents cannot be 
expected to look with customary equanimity upon this option for their 
65 See. e.g., J. Houl t Verkerke , Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U. 
CHI. L REV 115, 11 7 n. 7 (re viewi ng studies suggest ing that some degree of job change: and employee 
tumover, by o\\owing workers "to sea rch fol" another job that better matches their ab ilities," helps to 
"pl"omotc[] e!'lic icncy" in JOb markets) 
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daughters. The penalty that parents of caretaking children can expect to 
pay may have a number of consequences. First, parents will come to favor 
sons over daughter more than they perhaps already do. Women tend to 
earn less than men of similar age and education. Therefore, sons' expected 
earnings and expected contribution to any parental dividend fund will as a 
general matter be greater than daughters' regardless of whether daughters 
take on caretaking roles. But daughters' tendency to sacrifice paid work to 
domestic activities will also undermine their projected contributions to the 
dividend fund and their value in parents' eyes. All these factors might 
encourage parents to invest more heavily in their sons' education or to 
favor their male offspring in other ways. 
Thus, parental preference will add to whatever pressure already exists 
on women to favor paid over unpaid domestic work. A program that starts 
out with the objective of rewarding and encouraging traditional women's 
work will have the effect of discouraging the very activities it seeks to 
promote. Even more unfortunately, the parental dividend will enhance the 
conflicts women already feel from the need to function as both 
breadwinner and caretaker by pitting a woman's interest in investing in her 
own children (who will eventually pay into her parental dividend fund) 
against her parents' pressure on her to go out and earn a living (and pay 
more money into theirs). Women's parents will want them working early 
and often, but the daughters' own self-interest will dictate bearing children 
and caring for them reasonably well. This bind will be especially acute for 
single mothers, who are already buckling under the pressure of the 
conflicting demands of their various roles. 
Burggraf appears to recognize this problem, but her proposed solution 
raises as many difficulties as it cures. On the theory that "parents who 
produce a family caretaker contribute as much to the next generation's 
reproductive success as do parents who produce a family breadwinner," 
Burggraf suggests that married couples contribute an equal amount, based 
on the unit's total income, into funds for both spouse's parents, thus 
charging the breadwinner in a traditional family with support for two sets 
of parents.66 Burggraf sees this "split dividend" as parallel to proposals for 
reforming Social Security through the creation of "personal security 
accounts," whereby family wage earners contribute an amount prorated to 
half of total family income to earnings accounts earmarked separately for 
husband and wife .67 But the drawbacks of the split dividend parallel some 
66 Burggraf states that "[i]f Social Security were converted to a parental dividend, taxes 
should be based on a couple's joint return and the dividends distributed equally between the parents of 
husband and wife." BUGGRAF, supra note l, at 130. 
67 See id. These accounts have been proposed as a more equitable alternative to the current 
system, which designates the noneaming or lower-earning spouse as a secondary beneficiary on the 
breadwinner's account. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social 
Security , and SiOne, Seidman. Sunstein & Tushnet 's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUiV!. L. REV. 264, 286 
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of the difficulties inherent in the transition to personal security accounts 
based on income splitting within the current system. As compared to 
making each spouse responsible for his or her own parents, this 
arrangement greatly enhances men's premium on remaining single. Put 
another way, the arrangement tends to discourage marriage by adding to 
the burden of married men relative to single ones. Yet this effect 
potentially runs contrary to Burggraf s goal of achieving greater 
investments in children. Those investments depend on men's willingness 
to get married and stay married. Burdening breadwinners with the old-age 
support of two sets of parents potentialiy undermines both effects. 
Burggraf's proposal may also have unintended costs by creating incentives 
for parents to meddl·.~ perversely in their children ' s marital choices. 
Parents' ironclad control over their children 's rnatches is a cardina l feature 
of closed, traditional societies. The temptation to exercise such contTol is 
irresistible when children are charged with the support of aging parents, 
since the economic fate of the children's family unit and the integrity of 
their marriage bears directly on how their parents will fare. But that 
control creates a contlict of interest between parents and children that has 
produced much human misery. In general, the greater share of unhappiness 
from parental control over marital choices has fallen on women, who 
would bear the brunt under the parental dividend scheme as well. Because 
men generally have superior labor market prospects, parents will be far 
more interested in the marital choices of their daughters than their sons and 
will bring greater pressure to bear on females to make a potentially 
lucrative or prudent match. Parents could also be expected to mount more 
opposition to their daughters' divorces than their sons', since divorce 
might terminate , or at least attenuate, the son-in-law's obligation to pay 
into in-laws' parental dividend fund. 68 Moreover, the incentives would 
work in the opposite direction for sons. Parents might do better if their 
sons delayed marriage and childbearing, because all the sons' earnings 
contributions would be earmarked for the parents' fund alone and would 
not have to be shared with the parents of a caretaking spouse. Once again, 
the effects may perversely impede family formation and heap 
disadvantages on women by virtue of their caretaking function. 
Finally, Burggraf's proposal dramatically attenuates the redistributive 
component of the existing Social Security system, leaving behind only the 
intergenerational portion of that effect. A number of elements of 
( 1989) (disc uss in g an earnings shari ng proposal ); Karen Holden, Social Securi1y and the Econo111 ic 
Security of Women.· Is II Fair 7 , in SOC!AI. SECURITY , supra note ll , a t 91. 
68 Burrgra i' suggests at one poi nt that the ob li gat ion to pa y in to the fund of a fo rme r 'pouse's 
parents should survi vt: divo rce. See BURGG R.'\F. supm note l , at 1.3 7-39. But if the contribution to an 
ex-spouse were :tdj usted to rake into account any obligations to a new wife or· depcnd:mts or the new 
wife" s pa ren ts, the paren ts oi' ex-spouses could potentia ll y sufkr or their stake wou ld app•2ar less 
sec ure. 
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redistribution will be lost if Burggraf's system is adopted. As already 
noted, by exposing parents to the risk of child failure, Burggraf's proposal 
would enhance the value of the omnipresent option to remain childless and 
to invest the money that would otherwise be spent on children elsewhere. 
Indeed, Burggraf acknowledges that, although the parental dividend might 
affect the behavior of people who have already decided how many 
children to have, it can do little to encourage childbearing: "compared to 
the financial advantages of remaining childless, a parental dividend of any 
imaginable size would be very small change."69 
The importance of the "opt out" as an end run around the parental 
dividend may well differ by social class, however. Foregoing childbearing 
carries costs in the form of the lost consumption value, or satisfaction, that 
parents take in their children. The poor might prefer to invest in children 
because they have fewer alternative consumption opportunities. Also, it is 
more difficult for those with low income to save, regardless of whether 
they have children. At best, they face enormous practical obstacles to 
putting money away against the future. Consequently, children have 
always been an important and often exclusive form of investment for 
persons of low income. 70 In contrast, wealthy parents can often afford to 
devote resources to other valuable investments yielding future returns. In 
other words, the well-off are in the position to diversify their investments 
as a hedge against risk. By exposing the poor differentially to an important 
form of investment risk from which they can otherwise obtain little 
protection, the proposal would have a potentially regressive effect. 
Burggraf seems strangely indifferent to additional distributive effects 
of her proposal. Low-income workers would also probably be worse off 
under a parental dividend scheme than under the current arrangement for 
two additional reasons. First, the parental dividend abolishes a feature of 
the current program that gives individuals at the bottom of the earnings 
scale a far greater rate of return than higher income recipients on earnings 
contributions .71 Indeed, in this respect, the current program effec tive ly 
incorporates a subsidy running from high earners to low earners, which 
functions to offset the regressivity of the fixed percentage employment tax 
(FICA). By making each family circle responsible for supporting its own, 
Burggraf s plan shares a cardinal feature of the more extreme proposals for 
privatization: It abolishes the redistribution from rich to poor that is only 
made possible by pooling contributions across beneficiaries of different 
social classes and establishing a progressive benefits schedule. 
Second, Burggraf's proposal entrenches the economic inequalities 
69 !d. at 206. 
70 See ld. at 79-80. 
71 See LEVITAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 1-63; Chai t, supra note 54 (noting how so me 
privatization proposals nullify the progressively redistributive effec ts of the current program ). 
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that are persistently transmitted from generation to generation. The 
children of the poor and lower-middle class, upon reaching adulthood, are 
far more likely to gravitate towards the lower end of the earnings scale 
than the children of the upper-middle class. In addition, wholesale child 
failure, in the form of criminality, drug addiction, or early death, is likely 
to be more common among the poor. It is unclear whether these patterns 
are caused by lower quality or quantity of investment on the part of 
individual lower-income parents or by less immediately pliable factors 
such as background conditions or fixed traits. But even if the causes of 
class immobility are potentially amenable to incentive effects, there is no 
reason to believe that the incentives created by the parental dividend 
proposal will significantly alter the tendency of low-income parents to 
produce low-income children. We know almost nothing about what 
parents need to do to transform lower-middle class children into middle 
class and upper-middle class adults. Even if we did, it is not clear that a 
mere change in the design of Social Security would induce less fortunate 
parents to do those very things. That the parental dividend would probably 
do little to promote social mobility means that poor parents will receive 
significantly lower retirement benefits than more affluent parents, with 
loss even of the modest mitigation inherent in the current program. 
The relatively regressive effects of the parental dividend would, once 
again, be particularly hard on single mothers, who tend to be concentrated 
at the bottom end of the income scale and thus currently receive among the 
highest rate of return on their defined contributions. Burggraf's proposal 
already disfavors single mothers by effectively charging them both with 
the support of their own parents in old age and with the costs of bringing 
up their own children. Once again , the current system socializes some of 
those costs through redistribution across income classes. That feature 
would be abruptly terminated under Burggraf's proposal. Poor women 
would support poor parents and bring up poor children who would likely 
tum into relatively poor adults. Those poor children would in tum be 
charged with their own poor parents' support. 
Conclusion 
The parental dividend proposal, by understandably focusing for 
simplicity's sake on relations between two generations within each family, 
takes too narrow a view. Its parochialism is both horizontal and vertical 
because it ignores important distributive issues among successive 
generations and among parents and children across families from different 
economic and social classes. An analysis that extends beyond two 
generations reveals that the parental dividend proposal does not end the 
tug of war between successive generations or reconcile their interests. Nor 
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can it. By making the adult working population responsible for supporting 
both the elderly and the younger generation, Burggrafs proposal does not 
fundamentally alter the character of generous, pay-as-you-go old-age 
support in an era of declining fertility. Such a scheme will necessarily 
function as a zero- or negative-sum game whereby the cunent generation's 
parents and children can only win at each other's expense. That conflict is 
not peculiar to the parental dividend. It is an inevitable feature of all 
societies in which population and total productivity do not march 
inexorably upward. Perhaps that conflict can be resolved only by 
subordinating the interests of the elderly to a collective duty towards 
generations yet unborn. But we have all but abandoned the customary 
expectation, which held sway for thousands of years, that the elderly will 
sacrifice for the young. That abandonment is evident in our fertility rates, 
our attitudes towards childbearing, and in the design of our old-age 
pension scheme. 
Burggrafs proposal likewise represents an inadequate fix for the 
undervaluation of off-market, caretaking work, or for any underprovision 
for children in general. On the contrary, by putting the force of a 
politically powerful group-the elderly-behind market work, and setting 
it against a politically powerless group--children-that stands to benefit 
most from some parents refraining from careerism or high levels of paid 
employment, Burggraf has created a program that will lead society to pay 
even less attention to children than it now does. This consequence, 
perverse and unintended though it may be, can be traced to a fundamental 
feature of Burggrafs proposal, which insists upon cashing out the social 
value of the caretaker's investment in market terms. Parents and caretakers 
invest in human capital. For Burggraf, human capital must prove itself in 
the market. Any element of value or investment payoff that fails to convert 
into earnings simply drops from the equation and is conveniently 
forgotten. But then what becomes of the ongoing need to invest in future 
generations? The family is not a closed circle, but a chain, in which the 
investment process takes place largely outside the marketplace and never 
entirely crosses over. Some portion of value and human effort always 
remains on the nonmarket side, never to be fully assessed in terms of its 
pecuniary currency. In trying to capture that element for one generation 
only, Burggraf has broken the never ending chain. In the process she has 
dropped some important links. 
One alternative to the dilemma posed by the persistence of human 
capital production outside the marketplace may be to tr; to close down the 
non-market sector or at least drastically reduce its scope . The economist 
Barbara Bergmann has recentiy recognized the dilemmas posed by the 
permanent existence of a nonmarket, direct-exchange economy and has 
proposed to solve the problem by, in effect, abolishing or dramatically 
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shrinking that sector. 72 Bergmann believes that as long as market and 
nonmarket sectors are separately maintained, women's work will be 
undervalued and women's efforts will not be adequately rewarded. Only if 
traditional women's work is priced on a market along with other forms of 
labor will its true value be revealed and prove less vulnerable to 
manipulation. She therefore proposes unification of the market and 
nonmarket sectors by moving to "a high degree of commodification of the 
tasks that the present gender system assigns as unpaid duties to women."73 
But Bergmann's solution rests on a premise that Burggraf clearly does not 
share: that nothing important will be lost by substituting services obtained 
on the market for most unpaid services provided at home. Or perhaps 
Bergmann does recognize the unique value of specific performance, but 
would sacrifice that value added for her greater goal. 
The contrast between these approaches of the two feminist 
economists, Bergmann and Burggraf, is instructive. As radical as 
Burggrafs scheme may appear to those who cherish the current program 
of old-age support and resist its reform, the centerpiece of her plan is, after 
all, a proposal to reform Social Security. Bergmann goes far beyond just 
tinkering with social programs and legal rules for existing institutions. She 
wishes to produce a fundamental and sweeping transformation of the key 
facts of social life. In the end, Burggrafs book founders because it places 
far too much weight on one policy device. This is not to deny that the 
Social Security system is in jeopardy or that it needs reform. It surely is 
and it surely does. But this need is largely traceable to the cultural and 
social facts of modernity rather than to conditions created by the 
peculiarities of the design of the program itself. Burggrafs prescription is, 
alas, no antidote to what ails us, and may in fact leave us worse off. 
72 See Barbara R. Bergmann , 77z e Only Ticket to £qualify: To w! Androgyny, M ale Style , 9 J. 
CONTEi\ IP. LEG. ISSU ES 75 (l99S). 
7J /d. at ~6 . 
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